Tuesday, 30 June 2015
Government considers targeting hands-free phone use
'via Blog this'
Saturday, 27 June 2015
Ford can pursue lawsuit after Explorers wound up in China
'via Blog this'
'via Blog this'
Thursday, 25 June 2015
German cartel office says fines automotive suppliers 75 mln eur | Reuters
'via Blog this'
European Commission - PRESS RELEASES - Press release - Fighting cartels - Commission sanctions retail food packaging cartel and sends Statement of Objections in suspected car battery recycling cartel
The statements of objections allege that, from 2009 to 2012, these five companies agreed on prices for scrap lead-acid batteries in Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium.
Unlike in most cartels where companies usually conspire to increase their sales prices, the companies in this case appear to have colluded to reduce their purchase prices.
This may seem like desirable outcome, as the companies' purpose was to cut input prices and to reduce price volatility. However, the preliminary conclusion of our investigation is that the main goal of the cartel members was in fact simply to maintain higher profit margins. The cartel members may have lowered the prices paid to scrap dealers, many of which are small and medium-sized companies. This would then feed through in lower prices for used batteries sold for scrap, ultimately to the detriment of sellers.
The result, the Commission alleges, was the same as in any price-fixing cartel: disrupting the normal functioning of the market and preventing competition on price.
Artificially fixing the price of lead from recycled batteries, as the Commission suspects, is a very serious matter because it interferes with the effective functioning of the recycling market.
Around 80% of lead scrap comes from waste lead-acid car batteries and practically all car batteries undergo recycling at their end of life. Recycling companies process the batteries in various steps to produce pure lead or lead alloys, most of which is used for making new car batteries.
The concept of the ‘circular economy’ refers to re-using, repairing, refurbishing and recycling existing materials and products. Car battery recycling essentially functions in a closed-loop cycle but the behaviour of these companies would interfere with this loop and affect the circular economy.
If the existence of the cartel were to be confirmed, putting an end to such price fixing would make the market for recycling lead from car batteries more efficient.
The parties now have the opportunity to reply to the Commission's allegations in the statement of objections.""
'via Blog this'
Ireland: FTA backs Supreme Court motor tax appeal
'via Blog this'
CMA statement following completion of criminal cartel prosecution - News stories - GOV.UK
One defendant had already pleaded guilty, so on the face of it there was a cartel with one member ... Actually the way the law works, the better view (nay, the correct view) is that there was a cartel with at least three members but only one of them was going about price-fixing, market-sharing and bid-rigging dishonestly. No, I don't understand either, and perhaps that change in the law is not as nonsensical as it looks. Or, at least, a one-person cartel is a bigger nonsense than an offence with no requirement for dishonesty, and perhaps price-fixing etc are simply not activities that can be undertaken honestly - though what about "crisis cartels" which have been permissible under general competition rules? The dishonesty requirement would have been a get-out for a crisis cartel, but now that helpful safety valve has been closed.
'via Blog this'
Tuesday, 23 June 2015
Spain: CNMC penalises price-fixing cartel (with more still to come)
In the present decision, the CNMC identified seven different geographical cartels involving the three marques. Their illegal conduct included fixing maximum rebates and commercial conditions, and exchanging sensitive information. There were also enforcement mechanisms, imposing sanctions on dealers who failed to stick to the cartel rules: two firms of consultants who were involved in imposing sanctions and collecting 'fines' were also penalised.
'via Blog this'
New online vehicle recall search tool to help motorists - SMMT
'via Blog this'
In California, Uber driver is employee, not contractor: agency | Reuters
'via Blog this'
CMA acts to maintain trust in online reviews and endorsements
'via Blog this'
First ever motorist convicted for 'lane hogging' - Crime - UK - The Independent
'via Blog this'
Friday, 19 June 2015
Another trip down memory lane: Richard Cound v BMW, Clover Leaf Cars v BMW
While I am on the topic of old law which we should not forget (a couple of weeks ago it was the Supply of New Cars Order), I thought it worth mentioning these two important Court of Appeal cases on the block exemption. The first one, that is, but potentially still relevant. The trouble is I don't have complete reports, but on the basis that something is better than nothing and I want to have a readily-accessible note of the cases I thought it worth writing as much as I could here.
Richard Cound Ltd v BMW (GB) Ltd [1997] Eu. L.R. 301 was decided on 10 May 1995. The judges in the Court of Appeal were Balcombe LJ, Pill LJ, and Sir Roger Parker. Clover Leaf Cars Ltd v BMW (GB) Ltd [1997] Eu LR 53 was decided in the Court of Appeal (Staughton LJ and Thorpe J) on 28 December 1995 (and at first instance in the Chancery Division, apparently on 20 December that year, by Rattee J). Given that the termination of the dealer agreement in the second case was to take effect on 31 December, one can see perhaps why the courts dealt with it so urgently. (I don't at present have information about the situation in the Cound case, but as I recall the same facts applied - BMW terminated the agreement from 31 December 1995 - but the case was brought a bit more promptly.) In the Clover Leaf case, and (subject to confirmation) in Cound too I think, the key fact was that the dealer had been taken over by a PLC and BMW did not want too many of them in its network, so it gave (as it was entitled to do) 12 months' notice.
In each case, the important matter was not really whether the restrictions in the agreement on ownership were prohibited by Article 85(1) (as was, and in my mind often still is) and, if so, exempted by Regulation 123/85: the manufacturer's freedom to terminate without having to state a cause (to terminate for convenience) on 12 months' notice was enough to make the termination lawful. What was really interesting was the contention by the plaintiffs that the allegedly prohibited and therefore void provisions of the contract could be severed and the rest of the contract enforced without them. The court held that the issue of severance was governed by English law, following Chemidus Wavin Ltd v Societe pour la Transformation et l'Exploitation des Resines Industrielles SA [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 514. The judge in Cound had been right to conclude that the effect of severance would have been to alter the character of the agreement and that the agreement did not permit the excision of void terms such as to alter its scope and intention entirely: Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd v Murphy 1988 S.C. 353. In Clover Leaf, the court was able to follow the judgment in the earlier Cound case.
Also noteworthy, I think, is the court's holding (in both cases) that the termination was to be viewed as unilateral conduct by the manufacturer, not as something that constituted an agreement.
Consumer Prepayments on Retailer Insolvency - Law Commission
"In a consultation paper published on 18 June 2015, the Law Commission considers whether prepaying consumers should be better protected in the event of company insolvency, either through improved voluntary mechanisms or required by law."
'via Blog this'
Wednesday, 17 June 2015
London Taxi Maker Cries Foul Over Rival’s Green Cab Designs - Bloomberg Business
So far there appears only to have been a preliminary hearing, The London Taxi Corporation Ltd. v. Frazer Nash Research Ltd. & Anr, High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, HC14B01502. (It turns out, now that the judgment is available - see below - that it was an application relating to survey evidence, which the judge Spearman J was not inclined to allow.) Bloomberg reports that London Taxi alleges that Metrocab "breaches its trademarks", which they would not have written had they paid attention. The verb is "infringe" not "breach" and trade mark is two words ... But London Taxi Corporation has several registered trade marks covering the shape and appearance of their product (for example this one), so potentially there is infringement. Are the trade marks vulnerable to attack on the grounds that the design is generic, I wonder? And is the Metrocab similar enough for there to be a likelihood of confusion? It certainly looks significantly different to me, but I might not be an average user of London cabs.
Update: The London Taxi Corporation Ltd (t/a the London Taxi Company) v Frazer-Nash Research Ltd & Anor [2015] EWHC 1840 (Ch) (03 July 2015)
'via Blog this'
Trading Standards sting leaves Halfords Autocentre site with £32,000 fine
Nothing new there: in fact, even the story is rather old because the sting took place in March last year and has taken this long to get to court - where Halfords unsurprisingly pleaded guilty. They also argued (though it doesn't help, except in the media I suppose) that their technician picked up a couple of faults (unspecified in the report) that Trading Standards hadn't been aware of, and that the faults that the technician missed were not "overtly dangerous". (Surely it's the "covertly dangerous" ones that are worst anyway?) The court was told that the missed faults (brake fluid level, missing or broken bulbs, faulty windscreen wipers, oil leaks, irregular tyre pressures) should all have been picked up during the "major service": and of course understanding what is and what is not included, and the garage's duty to go beyond what might be on the menu, is key to getting it right.
It does seem to me that there ought to be better ways to go about putting these things right. The defendant here was not a railway arch operation, although by the same token one might say that the consumer should be able to expect more of Halfords than the guy under the arch. Perhaps the most important lesson is the damage that one unreliable employee can cause to a respectable business.
Postscript: Auto Express adds to the story that two other garages hit in the same operation did significantly better, though quite properly we are not told their identities as they seem to have done well enough to avoid prosecution. The trading standards department identified three garages which seemed from their data and that of the old OFT to be disproportionately complained about.
'via Blog this'
15 June 2015: Patents: Has Tesla Motors changed down a gear? - Reddie & Grose LLP
'via Blog this'
USA: N.Y. targets dealerships' sale of credit-repair, identity-theft products
"High-volume New York dealership Paragon Honda and its two sister stores have agreed to a $13.5 million settlement with the New York attorney general’s office over the alleged unlawful sale of credit-repair and identity-theft prevention products."'via Blog this'
Ford's Patent Announcement Not so Groundbreaking | DuetsBlog
'via Blog this'
Sunday, 14 June 2015
PCP clocking rise | Auto Retail Network
'via Blog this'
Friday, 12 June 2015
Supreme Court holds against VAT scheme
As Lord Sumption remarked, it is a very technical matter, so I take that as reason enough not to do more than reproduce the Supreme Court's Press Summary here ...
BACKGROUND TO THE APPEAL
Normally, when a car distributor buys a demonstrator car from the manufacturer, it pays VAT on the full wholesale price (“input tax”). Then, when it eventually sells the car to a customer, it collects VAT on the full retail price (“output tax”). It accounts to HMRC for the output tax it has collected less the input tax it has paid. The Pendragon Group, the largest car sales group in Europe, used a scheme devised by KPMG to reduce its VAT liability on two occasions in late 2000 and early 2001. The KPMG scheme exploited three exceptions to the normal incidence of VAT so that Pendragon would only have to account for VAT in respect of the difference between the wholesale purchase price and the retail sale price of its demonstrator cars. The scheme worked as follows.
Step 1: Pendragon bought cars from a wholesaler, then sold them to four captive leasing companies (“CLCs”). Pendragon paid input tax on the wholesale purchase price but recovered it by accounting for output tax received when the cars were sold to the CLCs.
Step 2: The CLCs immediately leased the cars to Pendragon dealerships. The CLCs paid input tax on the purchase of the cars from Pendragon but recovered it by accounting for output tax paid by the Pendragon dealerships on their rental payments under the leases.
Step 3: The CLCs then assigned the leases and their title in the cars to the offshore bank Soc Gen Jersey (“SGJ”). They received approximately £20m (financed by SG London, which received a further assignment of the assets as security). The assignment to an offshore bank was not a supply for VAT purposes and so no VAT was payable.
Step 4: Some 30 to 45 days later, SGJ transferred as a going concern the lease agreements and title in the cars to Captive Co 5. It also sold as a business the hire of cars said to have been carried on by SGJ. The total consideration exceeded £18m, with £100,000 in respect of goodwill. The sale of the business as a going concern was not a supply for VAT purposes and so no VAT was payable.
Step 5: The demonstrator cars were sold to customers by the dealerships, acting as agents for Captive Co 5. Customers paid VAT only on Captive Co 5’s profit on the sale, rather than on the total sale price, under the “profit margin” scheme, which is available under domestic law where the goods were acquired as part of a business transferred as a going concern.
It is common ground that the scheme technically worked, in that the transactions at steps 3 and 4 satisfied the conditions for exemption from VAT, and the transaction at step 5 satisfied the conditions for the application of the margin scheme. However, VAT is an EU tax (governed at the time by the Sixth Directive) and subject to the EU law principle of abuse of law. The First Tier Tribunal held that the scheme was not abusive. The Upper Tier Tribunal held that it was. The Court of Appeal restored the decision of the First Tier Tribunal. HMRC now appeals to the Supreme Court. It argues that the scheme was abusive and that Pendragon should have to pay to it the VAT avoided under the scheme.
JUDGMENTS
The Supreme Court unanimously allows the appeal and holds that the scheme was abusive. Lord Sumption, with whom all members of the Court agree, gives the leading judgment. Lord Carnwath adds further comments on the role of the Upper Tribunal.
REASONS FOR THE JUDGMENTS
In Halifax plc v Customs and Excise Commissioners (Case C-255/02) [2006] STC 919, the Grand Chamber said that, in the sphere of VAT, an abusive practice can be found to exist only if two conditions are met. [7]
The first condition is that it must be shown that the transactions concerned result in a tax advantage which would be contrary to the purpose of the conditions laid down in the relevant EU Directive and implementing national legislation. One must assume that it is the purpose of the VAT Directives to accommodate normal commercial transactions. [11] This condition is satisfied. The purpose of VAT is to tax consumption. The direct purpose of the margin scheme is to grant relief to traders who have acquired goods from a supplier who had no right to deduct input tax in respect of their own acquisition of them. The indirect purpose of the margin scheme is thereby to avoid double taxation, since second-hand goods may already have been the subject of a net VAT charge at some earlier stage in their history. [14-20] In this case, a system designed to prevent double taxation has been exploited so as to prevent any taxation at all. [30]
The fact that the margin scheme will sometimes apply in cases where there was no earlier net VAT charge is simply the consequence of designing a workable scheme. [22-23] Even if the margin scheme is made available by domestic rather than EU law, the underlying purpose of the margin scheme remains the same, and general principles of EU law, including the abuse of law principle, still apply; in any event, it must have been intended that the abuse of law principle should apply even as a matter of English domestic law. [24-29]
The second condition is that it must be objectively apparent that the essential aim of the transactions is to obtain a tax advantage. Even if a transaction has a legitimate commercial purpose, it is open to challenge if the accrual of a tax advantage constitutes its principal aim. [12] The scheme should be assessed as a whole. [13] This condition is also satisfied. It is not in itself objectionable that Pendragon chose to enter into a transaction with an offshore bank. However, it was essential to the scheme that Captive Co 5 acquire the cars as part of a business as a going concern, and for that to be possible, it was essential that the transferor of the business have acquired the cars by assignment. These steps were manifestly included for the sole purpose of reducing VAT liability. [31-34]
Abusive transactions must be redefined so as to re-establish the situation which would have prevailed absent the abusive practice. [8] This transaction should be redefined by stripping out the five captive companies, so that the dealerships will be accountable for VAT on the full second-hand price. [41-42]
The Court of Appeal held that the Upper Tribunal exceeded its proper appellate role by substituting its own decision for a decision of the First Tier Tribunal based on an evaluation of competing factors. In Lord Sumption’s opinion, the Upper Tribunal was entitled to intervene because the First Tier Tribunal erred in law. [35-40] Lord Carnwath adds that the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 now provides that, where the Upper Tribunal finds that the First Tier Tribunal has erred in law, it may itself remake the decision, including by making further findings of fact. It was appropriate for the Upper Tribunal to do so in this case in order to give guidance on the abuse principle. It was their decision rather than that of the First Tier Tribunal which should have been the main focus of the Court of Appeal’s consideration. [44-51]
References in square brackets are to paragraphs in the judgments
'via Blog this'
Heavy fines for car dealers who sold a dangerous vehicle - Car Dealer Magazine
Rees would buy salvage vehicles from insurance firms and sell them on. Lewis was sometimes involved in carrying out repairs and helping to make the sale. The case related to a Mitsubishi Pajero, which had been advertised for sale on the side of a road. It was sold for £650 but later found to have ‘serious defects’. It had to be scrapped after a several serious faults were discovered, including defective brake hoses and severe chassis corrosion.
The defendants were also ordered to pay costs of £3,400, compensation of £400 and a £200 victim surcharge.
'via Blog this'
Heavy fines for car dealers who sold a dangerous vehicle - Car Dealer Magazine
'via Blog this'
72% of London parking fine appeals won, says FTA
'via Blog this'
Google agrees to disclose autonomous car collision reports - Automotive World
'via Blog this'
Thursday, 11 June 2015
Trade marks: reference to the Court of Justice relating to continuing use of VM's trade mark in advertising for former authorised repairer
"A request for a preliminary ruling in a case which concerns the unauthorised use of online advertisements as confirmation of an official commercial relationship beyond the termination of the parties contracted period, where the advert was not placed on the internet by the person featuring in it and the person featured took steps to remove it."According to a Dutch government website, http://www.minbuza.nl/ecer/hof-van-justitie/nieuwe-hofzaken-inclusief-verwijzingsuitspraak/2015/c-zakennummers/c-179-15-daimler.html, which is inviting people to suggest an intervention, but in greater detail than the IPO is, Együd Garage was a Mercedes repairer until 31 March 2012. Advertisements (both in print and on the Internet, it seems, but Google Translate has struggled a bit with the Dutch and I am hardly qualified to second-guess it - I will try to find a suitably qualified friend to help) indicated that the garage was still a member of the Daimler franchise, but the information was published (including being placed on the Internet) by third parties. The garage had asked them to remove or change the adverts, but evidently without success. It seems that the operator of a website where the information was found said that they had taken over someone else's business and the offending ad was included, which is hardly a convincing excuse. It seems pretty clear that had the garage run the ads it would have infringed Daimler's marks, but is it an infringement by the garage if the ads are under the control of a third party? One would hope that the garage would not be held liable, especially if it has tried hard to put matters right. (Hat tip to the Class 46 blog and the IPKat for telling me about the reference: if you want to comment to the IPO, urging the UK to intervene in the case, you must contact them by 15 June. Instructions are at the far end, as it were, of the link above.)
'via Blog this'
Motor Law volume 14 no 9
Here are links to documents referred to in the newsletter.
Consumer Rights Act: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/contents/enacted
CMA final order on motor insurance: https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/private-motor-insurance-market-investigation
Federal Trade Commission and Mini warranties https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/03/bmw-settles-ftc-charges-its-mini-division-illegally-conditioned
European Commission and credit charge fees: press release http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4585_en.htm
Court of Justice on unfair contract terms http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-02/cp150019en.pdf
German case on termination of FIAT network http://www.kfz-betrieb.vogel.de/neuwagen/articles/474194/
Monday, 8 June 2015
Friday, 5 June 2015
Google Will Now Tell Everyone When its Driverless Cars are in a Crash | TIME
'via Blog this'
Court of Justice clarifies the rules on consumer guarantees
The headline is: 'Any lack of conformity which becomes apparent within six months of the delivery of goods is to be presumed to have existed at the time of delivery.' That might tell you all you need to know!
On 27 May 2008, Ms Froukje Faber purchased a secondhand vehicle at a garage. On 26 September 2008, the vehicle caught fire during a journey and was completely destroyed. It was towed to the seller’s garage by a breakdown lorry and then, at the request of that garage, to a scrapyard to be kept there. Ms Faber maintains, in contrast to the garage, that, on that occasion, the parties spoke about the accident and about the possible liability of the garage. By letter of 11 May 2009, Ms Faber gave the seller’s garage notice that she was holding it liable. A technical investigation into the cause of the vehicle fire could not take place as the vehicle had been scrapped in the meantime.'via Blog this'
As the seller disputed that it was liable, Ms Faber brought legal proceedings. The Gerechtshof (Regional Court of Appeal) Arnhem-Leeuwarden, Netherlands, before which the dispute was brought on appeal, decided to refer questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.
As regards whether the national court is required to examine of its own motion whether, in the present case, Ms Faber is to be regarded as a consumer within the meaning of Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees (OJ 1999 L 171, p. 12), even though she has not relied on that status, the Court replies, in its judgment delivered today, in the affirmative. Whether the consumer is assisted by a lawyer or not cannot alter that conclusion.
In the same vein, the Court confirms that the national court may of its own motion raise Article 5(3) of the directive in the context of an appeal. That provision provides that, unless proved otherwise, any lack of conformity which becomes apparent within six months of delivery of the goods is, in principle, to be presumed to have existed at the time of delivery. In view of the nature and importance of the public interest underlying the protection which that provision confers on consumers, it must be regarded as a provision of equal standing to a rule of public policy within the domestic legal system.
The referring court also asks whether the principle of effectiveness precludes a national rule which requires the consumer to prove that he informed the seller of the lack of conformity in good time. According to Netherlands law, it is in principle for the consumer, if there is a challenge by the seller, to furnish evidence that he informed the seller of the lack of conformity of the goods delivered within a period of two months after the discovery of the lack of conformity.
The Court points out in that regard that Art. 5(2) of Directive 1999/442 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees permits Member States to provide that the consumer must, in order to benefit from his rights, inform the seller of the lack of conformity within a period of two months from the date on which he detected such lack of conformity.
According to the travaux préparatoires in respect of that directive, that option reflects the aim of reinforcing legal certainty, by encouraging ‘diligence’ on the part of the purchaser, ‘taking the seller’s interests into account’, ‘but does not establish a strict obligation to carry out a detailed inspection of the good’.
The Court explains that the obligation imposed on the consumer is limited to that of informing the seller that a lack of conformity exists. The consumer is not required, at that stage, to furnish evidence that a lack of conformity actually adversely affects the goods that he has purchased or to state the precise cause of that lack of conformity. By contrast, in order for the notification to be of use to the seller, it must include a certain number of particulars, the degree of precision of which will necessarily vary depending on the specific circumstances of each case.
Lastly, the referring court asks how the apportionment of the burden of proof functions and, in particular, which matters it is for the consumer to establish.
The Court states that if the lack of conformity has become apparent within six months of delivery of the goods, the directive relaxes the burden of proof which is borne by the consumer by providing that the lack of conformity is presumed to have existed at the time of delivery. In order to benefit from that relaxation the consumer must nevertheless furnish evidence of certain facts.
Firstly, the consumer must allege and furnish evidence that the goods sold are not in conformity with the contract in so far as, for example, they do not have the qualities agreed on or even are not fit for the purpose which that type of goods is normally expected to have. The consumer is required to prove only that the lack of conformity exists. He is not required to prove the cause of that lack of conformity or to establish that its origin is attributable to the seller.
Secondly, the consumer must prove that the lack of conformity in question became apparent, that is to say, became physically apparent, within six months of delivery of the goods.
Once he has established those facts, the consumer is relieved of the obligation of establishing that the lack of conformity existed at the time of delivery of the goods. The occurrence of that lack of conformity within the short period of six months makes it possible to assume that, although it became apparent only after the delivery of the goods, it already existed ‘in embryonic form’ in those goods at the time of delivery.
It is therefore for the professional seller to provide, as the case may be, evidence that the lack of conformity did not exist at the time of delivery of the goods, by establishing that the cause or origin of that lack of conformity is to be found in an act or omission which took place after that delivery.
Thursday, 4 June 2015
USA: Toyota Settles BB King Guitar Case
'via Blog this'
Monday, 1 June 2015
Salesman escapes jail after faking service histories - Car Dealer Magazine
He pleaded guilty to two offences of using an instrument, six vehicle service histories, which he knew to be false with the intention of somebody accepting it as genuine under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981, and received an eight-month suspended sentence. A Renault Scenic had three fake stamps and was sold for £4,780 while another, a Ford Fusion, had false stamps put in for 2010, 2011 and 2012. A Saab sold for £2,926 but it suffered faults and when the buyer returned it she received just £200. A Hampshire Trading Standards investigation found another customer bought a car with three stamps reported by the previous owner to be false. There was no suggestion that he had sold cars in a dangerous condition.
Recorder Atkinson sentenced Angelo, of Pettycot Crescent, Gosport, to 12 months, reduced to eight months for his early guilty plea. He was also sentenced to complete 84 hours’ unpaid work and to pay £100 victim surcharge.
'via Blog this'
Trip down memory lane: The Supply of New Cars Order 2000
The Order, I remind you, was the legislative response to the Competition Commission's report on New Cars, which had found that prices to private consumers were some 10 per cent higher than they would be in a competitive market (a finding which the manufacturers, unsurprisingly, disputed) and came into effect on 1 September 2000: it remains in force today, as I noted in April.
Aimed at some of the abuses identified in the New Cars report, it sought to prevent unjustified discrimination by suppliers between dealers and fleet purchasers in the discounts offered for the outright purchase of cars. It also prohibited suppliers from discriminating against dealers because of their (the dealers') advertised resale prices, and from preferring dealers who did not supply new cars obtained from dealers elsewhere in the EU.
The block exemption got most of the blame for the problems identified by the Competition Commission, of course. Back then it was Regulation 1474/95, block exemption v2 (or perhaps v1.2 would be more accurate: it bore a strong resemblance to Regulation 123/85, and radical changes only appeared with Regulation 1400/2002). The Competition Commission took the view that virtually all the restrictive features of selective distribution systems (e.g. showroom brand exclusivity, standards of presentation, the requirement to provide servicing and repair facilities, and the prevention of sales to resellers) worked against the public interest. It was only in 2002 that the new block exemption introduced multifranchising and broke the sales-service tie that had underpinned the first two iterations of the regulation. The Competition Commission, reckoning that these practices were partly responsible for increased prices to consumers, recommended they be outlawed - though it couldn't actually do that itself, so it had to talk to the European Commission about that because the block exemption actually permitted them.
The Order was directed at the issues that the government was able to deal with, while vague threats were heard about removing the benefit of the block exemption in the UK under Article 8 of the regulation, something that the government hoped to persuade the European Commission to do: or, more controversially, for the UK government itself to seek unilaterally to disapply the block exemption. Neither of these ideas ever bore fruit, although the 2002 changes to the regulation had a very similar effect.
The Competition Commission had found that there was a substantial discrepancy in the way the fleet market and the dealer market operated, with fleet buyers able to negotiate competitive discounts for bulk purchasers and dealers only being able to get supplies at a single basic prices regardless of volume, but on sale or return terms. Hence the remedy in the order of allowing dealers to buy supplies outright on terms similar to those offered for comparable volumes to fleet buyers. It used the power of the competitive fleet market to drive down prices in the uncompetitive dealer market - or so the government hoped.
It would not, of course, be as simple as it looked. Nothing in the car market ever is. Dealers are intermediaries and fleet customers end-users, though they also had an important role (especially the daily hire companies) as manufacturers of 6-month old used cars, the supply of which was a huge distorting factor with a major impact on the new car market. Dealers had other benefits from their relationship with the manufacturer, too, and the Order allowed the value of benefits offered to dealers but not to fleet customers to be taken into account when comparing prices.
Manufacturers would also have been aware that when they negotiated in future with fleet purchasers, any discounts they gave them would have an effect on the discounts they would have to offer to dealers. The more competitive fleet market might have become less competitive as a result of the Competition Commission's activities, which would be ironic to say the least.
The Order also contained an information remedy, without which it is hard to see how it might ever have worked. Suppliers had to notify dealers, at regular intervals, of the discount terms on which they were prepared to supply various volumes of cars: and those terms had to reflect those offered to fleets in line with the non-discrimination remedy. The Competition Commission had rejected the idea of recommending that wholesale prices be published because that might well have restricted competition in the fleet sector.
Suppliers also had to publish information about the number of pre-registered cars supplied, and the gross income received by the supplier from those sales. Pre-registrations were seen as another major distorting factor, and of course were never very popular with dealers. As recently as 2012, KPMG were reporting that car sales seemed to be holding up very well and attributing this to pre-registrations, which it suggested were not being reported as candidly as the legislation required. (Perhaps the manufacturers had forgotten the Order existed?) In 2011, AM reported an employment tribunal case in which allegations about unlawful pre-registrations played a part. And only last autumn, Fleet News revealed that leasing companies were being offered different terms according to whether the car would go to an individual or business customer. So we forget this obscure little piece of legislation at our peril!